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CONCERNING THE REVIEW
With this number the REVIw

begins publishing signed

subject comments submitted by contributors who are not
members of the Editorial Boards. The first of these, found
herein at page 238, has been contributed by B. H. Hartogensis, Esq., of the Baltimore City Bar. The REVIEW will
also continue to carry unsigned subject comments (and
also casenotes) prepared by members of the Boards. Ex-
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amples of these are found in the present number following
Mr. Hartogensis's comment and in the February number
at the beginning of the casenote and comment section.
The REVIEw believes that such subject conunents of
factual and informational nature will prove as useful to the
readers as the analytical and interpretational leading
articles. The hope is expressed that members of the Bar
can be induced to contribute material of each sort. In
distinguishing between leading articles and subject comments along the lines set out just above the REvIEW is following the examples of several of the established legal
journals.

NEWS OF THE LAW SCHOOL
Dean Howell has been appointed to serve for another
year as Chairman of the Special Committee on Non-Member
Schools of the Association of American Law Schools.
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, in its
March and April, 1937 numbers, has published an article
in two installments by Professor Strahorn entitled "A
Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions."

AN EARLY MARYLAND DECISION ON JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF LEGISLATION.*
The current controversy over President Roosevelt's
recent proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court of the United
States has focussed attention on the general problem of
judicial review of legislation and on the case of Marbury v.
Madison,1 which was the first case in which the Supreme
Court, then speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall,
* The REVIEW is indebted to G. Ross Veazey, Esqi., of the Baltimore City

Bar for calling attention to the Whittington case and the other materials

and for suggesting that they be presented to the readers. The matter of
the history of judicial review of legislation has been extensively treated
at various times in the past. No effort has been made herein to incorporate the whole literature of the problem. The local materials are presented because of the possible current Interest to the members of the
Maryland bar.
I Iranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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exercised the power to declare statutes unconstitutional.
While the R~viEw refrains, for reasons of policy, from
taking either side of the controversy over the merits of the
President's proposal, yet it is felt that the readers on both
sides of the question may be interested in an early Maryland case, decided less than a year before Marbury v. Madison, which also asserted the doctrine of judicial power to
hold statutes unconstitutional. Although no actual coincidence of language appears yet the reasoning' foreshadows
that of Marshall's famous opinion, and, because of the identity of the participants in the case, it may throw some light
on the interpretation of the United States Constitution
itself.
The case was Whittington v. Polka decided in the Maryland General Court" by Chief Judge Jeremiah Townley
Chase. In that case the plaintiff, William Whittington,
had been appointed and commissioned Chief Justice of the
County Courts of the Fourth District (Caroline,- Dorchester, Somerset, and Worcester Counties) under the
statute of 17961 which provided that the terms of the
justices should last during good behavior. The then current state constitution provided' that all judges should
hold their commissions during good behavior. By a later
Act of 1801 the former statute was repealed and under
the later one the defendant, William Polk, was commissioned by the Governor to' serve in place of the plaintiff.
Luther Martin then brought an action of novel disseisin
on behalf of the plaintiff against the defendant, on the
I Beveridge says that in the Maryland case the opinion employs "precisely the same reasoning" as was used by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.
Beveridge, Life of John Marshall, III, 612, app. c.
I H. & J. 236 (1802).
'The General Court, like the Chancery Court, was a central trial court
of state-wide jurisdiction. Although legally inferior to the Court of Appeals yet it was, until abolished in 1806, very highly regarded, as much
so as the Court of Appeals.

To this effect and in general concerning the

General Court, see Bond, The Court of Appeals of Maryland-A History,
Ch. III, 58-98. It is interesting to note that both Judge Chase, who wrote

the opinion, and William Polk, who was defendant, later served together on
the Court of Appeals after its reorganization in 1806. The former served
as 5Chief Judge and the latter as one of the Associate Judges.
Acts 1796, Ch. 43 as amended Acts 1797, Ch.69.

'Md. Const. (1776), Form of Government, Se. 40.
T
Acts 1801, Ch. 74.
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ground that the defendant had unjustly disseised the plaintiff of his freehold in the office. The plaintiff relied on the
provision of the state constitution and contended that he
had a vested interest in his office during good behavior
and that the later Act could not constitutionally deprive
him of his life tenure.
While the Court held for the defendant both on the
ground' that the constitutional provision protected only
"judges" and not "justices", and because the writ of novel
disseisin was not the proper method by which to raise the
question9 yet it discussed the question of its power to hold
a statute unconstitutional if it found a statute to violate
some constitutional provision. Although the correctness
of both the following propositions was conceded by counsel, yet the court discussed1" at great length whether it is
correct:
"1. That an act of assembly repugnant to the Constitution is void," and
"2. That the Courts have a right to determine al
act of assembly void, which is repugnant to the Constitution."
The Court pointed out11 that the State Constitution,
composed of the Bill of Rights and the Form of Government, was a compact between the people of Maryland which
established that all government, of right, originates from
the people, who through the compact had distributed governmental powers to the several departments of government subject to the restrictions the people had seen fit to
impose. Said the Court :12
"The legislature, being the creature of the constitution and acting within a circumscribed sphere, is not
omnipotent, and cannot rightfully exercise any power,
but that which is derived from that instrument.
"The constitution having set certain limits or landmarks to the power of the legislature, whenever they
* 1 H. & J. at 248-9.
* 1 H. & J. at 249-50.
10 1 H. & J.at 241 et seq.
1 1 H. & J. at 242.
sIbid, et seq.
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exceed them they act without authority, and such acts
are mere nullities, not being done in pursuance of
power delegated to them: Hence the necessity of some
power under the constitution to restrict the acts of the
legislature within the limits defined by the constitution.
"The power of determining finally on the validity
of the acts of the legislature cannot reside with the
legislature, because such power would defeat and
render nugatory, all the limitations and restrictions
on the authority of the legislature, contained in the
bill of rights and form of government, and they would
become judges" of the validity of their own acts, which
would establish a despotism and subvert that great
principle of the constitution, which declares that the
powers of making, judging, and executing the law,
shall be separate and distinct from each other ...
" ... It is the office and province of the court to
decide all questions of law which are judicially brought
before them, according to the established mode of proceeding, and to determine whether an act of the legislature, which assumes the appearance of a law, and is
clothed with the garb of authority, is made pursuant
to the power vested by the constitution in the legislature; for if it is not the result or emanation of authority
derived from the constitution, it is not law, and cannot
influence the judgment of the court in the decision of
the question before them ...
"The oath of a judge is 'that he will do equal right
and justice according to the law of this state, in every
case in which he shall act as judge.'
"To do right and justice according to the law, the
judge must determine what the law is, which necessarily involves in it the right of examining the constitution. (which is the supreme or paramount law,
and under which the legislature derive the only authority they are invested with, of making laws), and considering whether the act passed is made pursuant to
the constitution, and that trust and authority which
is delegated thereby to the legislative body.
"The three great powers or departments of government are independent of each other, and the legislature, as such, can claim no superiority or pre-emi-
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nence over the other two. The legislature are the
trustees of the people, and, as such, can only move
within those lines which the constitution has defined
as the boundaries of their authority, and if they should
incautiously, or unadvisedly transcend those limits,
the constitution has placed the judiciary as the barrier
or safeguard to resist the oppression, and redress the
injuries which might accrue from such inadvertent, or
unintentional infringements of the constitution."
The Whittington case was decided on June 12, 1802, and
Marbury v. Madison on February 24, 1803. Senator Beveridge, in his Life of John Marshall,"3 lists the Whittington
case as one, among others, of which Marshall may have
heard before he delivered his opinion in Marbury v. Madison. Beveridge admits that the report of the Whittington
case was not published until 1821 but suggests that Marshall may have heard of it through Chase. Beveridge said:
"Marshall was surely informed of this case by Chase who,
as Chief Justice of Maryland, decided it." This is an
obvious error on Beveridge's part for he apparently confused the Samuel Chase" of Maryland who sat on the
Supreme Court with Marshall and the Jeremiah Townley
Chase who wrote the opinion in the Whittington case. Incidentally, the latter was "Chief Judge" and not "Chief
Justice". This is a distinction which is all the more important because of the detail of the Whittington case.
Regardless of whether Marshall had ever heard of the
Whittington case, it is seemingly relevant on the question
of judicial review by the Federal Courts for another reason, viz., Luther Martin's connection both with the case
and the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Martin's connection with the Whittington case, as counsel for the plaintiff who asserted the applicability of the doctrine of unconstitutionality of legislation, shows his agreement with the
propositions announced in the language of the opinion,
which agreed with the major premise of his client's case,
although not with the minor.
18

Beveridge, loc cit., supra note 2.

14 Samuel Chase had sat on the General Court prior to his appointment

to the Supreme Court of the United States In 1796.
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It was Martin who, in the Constitutional Convention of
1787, introduced the resolution15 which, as shortened, became the "Supreme law of the land" clause of the Constitution, reading:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
16
laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
The insertion of the substance of the Luther Martin
resolution in the Constitution goes far to show that the
framers had in mind that state judges might not willingly
enforce statutes passed in pursuance of the Constitution.
It was generally thought that Federal judges would not
hesitate to follow Federal law. The effort was to make
certain that any legislative act, State or Federal, should be
gauged by the State judiciary by applying the Constitution
as the Supreme Law of the land.
Luther Martin's acceptance of the doctrine of judicial
review of legislation as shown by his position in the Whittington case may throw some light on the meaning of the
"Supreme law of the land" clause of the Constitution
which, in substance, he introduced. It may go to show
that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that th d
courts should have the power to declare legislation unconstitutional.
15

Mr. Brinton Coxe, in his Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional
Legislation (1893) points out that on July 17, 1787 Luther Martin offered
this Resolution In the Constitutional Convention:
"Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made by virte
and in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties made and rdtifled under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the respective states, as far as those acts, or treaties, shall relate to the
said states, or their citizens and Inhabitants :-and that the Judiciaries of
the several states shall be bound thereby in their decisions--anything in
the respective laws of the individual states to the contrary, notwithstanding."
4

" United States Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2.

